Upon closer examination, however, it appears that while existing law in this area does not necessarily provide definitive and universally accepted answers to all questions that may arise, it does provide the needed structure for analysis. The development of international law in this area will be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, and particularly in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, there has been much discussion of a coming revolution in military affairs, in which technological advances are said to be on the verge of profoundly altering not only the way we fight and the weapons we use, but the very way in which we conceive of conflict, about how wars are fought and how operations other than war are pursued. The anticipated revolution is driven primarily by information technologies that allow the manipulation of information and information systems used by and against potential adversaries. While there is no more difficult time and place from which to identify and assess a revolution than at its center while it is happening, there can be no doubt that there are highly significant changes, be they revolutionary or evolutionary, taking place as a result of new information technologies, and that those changes will significantly affect warfighting equipment and hardware, techniques, doctrine, and paradigms. Those changes will in turn compel an examination of their implications for and affects on international law and relationships among nations. In its most inclusive sense, IW has been described as the use of information to achieve national objectives. 4 The significance of so comprehensive a concept can only be profound:
THE NATURE OF INFORMATION WARFARE
information in itself is a key aspect of national power and, more importantly, is becoming an increasingly vital national resource that supports diplomacy, economic competition, and effective employment of military forces... (I)nformation warfare, in its most fundamental sense, is the emerging "theater" in which future nation against nation conflict at the strategic level is most likely to occur. Information warfare is also changing the way the theater or operationallevel combat and everyday military activities are conducted. Finally, information warfare may be the theater in which "operations other than war" are conducted... Information warfare, then, may define future warfare or, to put it another way, be the central focus for thinking about conflict in the future.
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Nor can we assume that such reverberations will be limited to the activities and relationships among nations. As the same author went on to observe:
. world examples of our vulnerability consider the dissemination of a software worm through the internet in 1988, which infected over 6,000 host computers around the world in less than two hours, and a one-byte coding error (a "6" substituted for a "d") that caused the near total shutdown of telephone service in the WashingtonBaltimore area in 199l. Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Counsel has taken measures to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of the right of self defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Counsel and shall not in any way affect the authority of the Security Counsel under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
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The nature and boundaries of the right of self defense, however, are not clearly defined and continue to be debated. The debate centers on two main issues: the meaning of the phrase "if an armed attack occurs," and the extent to which customary international law regarding self defense has been preempted by the United Nations Charter. Additionally, there is continuing debate regarding the extent to which other justifications for the use of force, found in customary international law, have survived the adoption of the Charter.
This is an appropriate point to note that while the word "coercion" frequently arises in the context of discussing the use of force, coercion and force are not necessarily synonymous. Others have argued with equal vigor that the Charter's reference to the inherent right of self defense in the event of armed attack was never intended to alter that right as it was customarily conceived, and that customary law has survived and continued to evolve in parallel with the Charter:
(A)rticle 51 was not drafted for the purpose of deliberately narrowing the customary-law permission of self-defense against a current or imminent unlawful attack by raising the required degree of necessity... Further, in... formulating the prohibition of unilateral coercion contained m article 2(4) it was made quite clear... that the traditional permission of self-defense was not intended to be abridged or attenuated but... to be reserved and maintained.
In addition to taking a more permissive view regarding the immediacy of the threat needed to justify the exercise of self defense, customary international law allowed nations to react with force in several other situations short of actual armed attack. Examples of these other possible justifications were peacetime reprisals, protection of nationals, humanitarian intervention and self help in securing a nation's internationally recognized legal rights. 23 In general, it appears that these have remained viable only to the extent that they can be fit under a somewhat enlarged umbrella of -self defense.» For instance, reprisal or punishment of one nation by another for an illegal act, is difficult to justify as self defense even if its object is to compel compliance with international law. Thus, today, reprisal is generally condemned.
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Protection by a state of its own nationals abroad, on the other hand, is viewed favorably as a form of "self defense" of its citizens (similar to the defense of territorial integrity and political independence).
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Self help to secure or enforce a nation's legal rights seems to have survived as a justification for resorting to force only in the sense of a nation defending itself against a forcible threat emanating from the territory of another nation, not originated by the second nation, but which the second nation is either unable or unwilling to remove. Indeed, this sort of self defensive self help has been explained as an exercise of self defense under Article 51:
...for an armed attack to justify countermeasures of selfdefense under Article 51, it need not be committed by another state... Whether an armed attack is initiated by or only from a foreign country, the target state is allowed to resort to self-defense by responding to unlawful force with lawful counter force.
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All of this is consistent with the proposition, alluded to earlier in the discussion of Article 2 (4) , that near universal acceptance of the United Nations Charter has had a significant affect on the evolution of customary international law.
The foregoing is not intended, by any means, to be an exhaustive discussion of permissible use of force, but only to outline the general parameters of this area of international law and to highlight some areas of continuing controversy. The point is that, far from being a settled set of clearly defined rules, this is an area where, at best, there are a limited number of general principles upon which nations are agreed and many opportunities for differing interpretations regarding their application. This undoubtedly is so for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the way in which war and peace were conceptualized at the time the Charter was written.
Traditionally, war was defined as a contention (violent struggle) between or among nations, through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the victor desired.
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Nations were considered to be either at peace or at war. These were separate and distinct conditions which allowed little if any ambiguity.
The United Nations Charter was adopted almost immediately following the conclusion of World War II, the greatest manifestation of "total war" the world has ever seen. The League instance. This, however, is not unlike the analysis required whenever the use of force is examined in equivocal circumstances.
An instructive parallel can be found in discussion of the application of force in response to terrorist attacks. Although IW certainly has the potential to be used as a form of terrorism, e.g. deliberately aimed at civilians or other unlawful targets, it is not only in that context that the analogy is instructive.
In both situations, as is also true in the case of low intensity conflict, the target nation suffers damage by an adversary that requires a response, but the "attack" does not fit neatly within the existing model offered by Article 51.
Although not explicitly stated as such, a common thread and arguably the key factor running through such discussions appears to be the question of necessity, as is suggested in this passage:
For the protection of the general community against extravagant claims, the standard of required necessity has been habitually cast in language so abstractly restrictive as almost, if read literally, to impose paralysis. Such is the clear import of the classical peroration of Secretary of State Webster in the Caroline case-that there must be shown 'a necessity of self defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." The requirement of proportionality... is frequently expressed in equally abstract terms There is, however, increasing recognition that the requirements of necessity and proportionality... can ultimately be subjected only to that most comprehensive and fundamental test of all law, reasonableness in particular context.
29
It is a fundamental fact that nations will defend, with force if necessary, what they perceive to be their genuinely vital 13 interests. That they consistently endeavor to do so within the parameters of self defense is a tribute to the degree to which the pacific ideal expressed by the Charter has come to be accepted by the international community. Even so, the insistence by individual nations upon being the ultimate arbitrators of the necessity of force is recognized, if not necessarily applauded, by commentators:
... all United Nations members are well aware of their right of self-defense -as they see it. It is doubtful if they would ever ask fellow delegates if a specific incident, actively encountered, would justify self-defense. They would, instead, react individually and debate the right at some later date. Self-defense, by definition, defies deliberation. 30 It has also been observed:
Competence to make an initial ...determination without previous authorization from the organized community (of nations) must be conceded to the claimant pending the completion of a much more viable world public order... The inevitable time-lag between initiation of highly intense coercion and appropriate determination and authorization by the general security organization, and the ever present possibility of the organization's failure to make any determination at all make such a recommendation potentially disastrous for defending states. 31 Not all agree.
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Among those who do, however, such realism should not be interpreted as an abandonment of the Charter or the endorsement of international lawlessness. Rather, it reflects the fact that the development of international law is as much a diplomatic and political process as one of legal interpretation.
It evolves through experience and consensus.
IW will undoubtedly contribute substantially to this evolution as its capabilities and boundaries become clearer and the international community becomes better acquainted with its potential, for good or for evil. It is too soon to know which will predominate. Professor Stein has postulated the development of a massive IW capability that could induce societal psychosis in a nation on the receiving end of such an attack, leaving it disoriented well after the end of hostilities, unable to distinguish reality from illusion, or to think rationally or act on the basis of objective reality. Such a state, he asserts, could rival the carnage and devastation of nuclear war:
...as the techniques of 'cyberstrike' proliferate throughout the world, enabling small powers, nonstate actors, or even terrorist hackers to do massive damage to the United States, 'mutually assured cyberdestruction' may result in a kind of infowar deterrence." Others see IW as an element in a class of nonlethal weapons that could be used in response to various threats without producing the carnage that is otherwise an unavoidable result of armed conflict, calling them "weapons of mass protection." 34 
This,
however, raises what may well be the most difficult issue:
A key value and important policy issue central to nonlethality is the ability of nonlethal weapons to allow a nation equipped with them to act earlier against a threat. This same capability brings into question the level of international ... control over a state's ability to venture below the threshold of war. 35 The very flexibility that an IW response offers the strategist or operational commander introduces yet additional shades of grey in the continuum between nonuse and use of force. For those who assert the efficacy of international law a means to universal peace, this represents a danger in search of a prohibition. For example, although not discussing IW specifically, one commentator has written: ...any broadening,of the interpretation of the right to resort to military force is fraught with danger-Therefore international law roust develop along the path of eliminating all loopholes in the legal regulation of the ban on the use of force Unilateral coercive military measures must disappear from international practice in the future. In this regard international law must become maximally clear and unambiguous in not permitting any broad interpretation of the right to rely on force.
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This represents only the flavor of how debate is likely to unfold. In the more immediate future, it has been suggested that computer virus warfare (CVW) constitutes a unique capability comparable to chemical, biological or nuclear warfare, and one that is currently under development by a number of countries. As such, it is urged that consideration be given to classifying CVW as a weapon by international agreement, banning further development and including CVW as part of nonproliferation treaties. 37 A similar functional approach may be anticipated with regard to other applications of IW as well.
CONCLUSION
Although the existing body of international law does not necessarily provide definitive and universally accepted answers to the legal issues that will be raised in the course of the development of information warfare, it does provide the structure by which these issues will be addressed and analyzed. IW may well represent a coming revolution in military affairs, but with regard to international law it will be a catalyst for further evolution.
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